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WA"ISHINGTON LAW REVIEW
particular city). While these categories are not exhaustive, they illus-
trate the necessity for and possible means of judicial determination of
definite boundaries of the class of public figures.
Furthermore, if a privilege to make misstatements of fact about
public figures is ultimately allowed, proof that the false statements
were made knowingly or negligently, rather than with reckless dis-
regard, should be required for recovery by libeled public figures.4
The suggestion for a less demanding burden of proof for public figures
is based on the premise that, balanced against the possible injury to
individual reputation, uninhibited discussion of public figures is not as
necessary as such discussion of public officials. Some limitation on the
application of Sullivan is needed; uninhibited public debate is a valu-
able instrument in the preservation of freedom and our democratic
system, but not to the extent that it destroys the law of defamation and
in turn the protection of individual reputation.
IMPUTED CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
A master, riding as passenger in a vehicle operated by his servant
within the scope of employment, sustained personal injuries and prop-
erty damage when the vehicle collided with one negligently operated
by an employee of defendant corporation. In the master's suit to
recover from defendant corporation, his servant was found contribu-
torily negligent. The trial court ruled that this contributory negligence
was imputed to the master, as a matter of law, to bar recovery on his
negligence claim. On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed.
Held: The rule that contributory negligence of a servant acting within
the scope of his employment is imputed to a master so as to bar the
master's right of recovery against a negligent third party is abandoned
in automobile negligence cases. Weber v. Stokely-Van Camp, Inc.,
144 N.W.2d 540 (Minn. 1966).
Fault is the sine qua non of tort liability for negligence. 1 For
reasons of social policy-principally, allocation of risk to the party
better able to bear it-this fault standard has been departed from to
hold a principal vicariously liable for negligence of his agent acting
"But ef. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 87 Sup. Ct. 534, 543 (1967) (standard of negligence
too elusive in right of privacy action).
ISee PROSSER, TORTS § 74, at 506-07 (3d ed. 1964).
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within the scope of employment.2 When a principal seeks recovery
for his own damage from a negligent third party, the fault standard is
again departed from by imputing to the principal his agent's contribu-
tory negligence so as to bar the principal's recovery.3 This double
frustration of a faultless principal has become known as the "both-
ways" rule.4 Although the rule, insofar as it operates to impute con-
tributory negligence, has been repudiated in most agency relation-
ships,' the principal case is the first reported decision6 refusing to
impute to a master the contributory negligence of his servant.
The court in the principal case noted that social policies which
justify holding a master vicariously liable for his servant's negligence
do not justify imputing a servant's contributory negligence to his
master. The court noted that, while vicarious liability furthers com-
pensation of accident victims by allowing recovery from a master's
"deep pockets," imputed contributory negligence denies victims the
right to recover at all.7 It observed that a justification for imputation
is a master's right to control the conduct of his servant.' The court
asserted, however, that exercise of control by a master-passenger over
his servant-driver on high-speed, congested highways might be the
clearest evidence of active negligence by the master. In automobile
negligence cases, therefore, a theory of right of control could not
'Id. § 68, at 471. Other reasons advanced for vicarious liability are: a master
controls his servant's behavior; he has "set the whole thing in motion;" he has
selected the servant and trusted him and so should suffer for his wrongs, rather than
innocent strangers without opportunity to protect themselves. Ibid. See also James,
Vicarious Liability, 28 TUL. L. REv. 161 (1954).
'See generally Annot., 50 A.L.R.2d 1281 (1956); GREoRY, LEGISLATIvE LOSS
DisTRIBuToN IN NEGLIGENCE CASES 148 (1936); 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS §§
23.5-23.6 (1956) ; PROSSER, TORTS § 73 (3d ed. 1964) ; Gilmore, Imputed Negligence,
1 WIs. L. Rv. 193 (1921); James, Inputed Negligence and Vicarious Liability:
The Study of a Paradox, 10 U. FLA. L. REv. 48 (1957) ; Keeton, Imputed Contribu-
tory Negligence, 13 TEXAs L. REv. 161 (1936) ; Lessler, The Proposed Discard of the
Doctrine of Imputed Contributory Negligence, 20 FoRDHAm L. Rxv. 156 (1951);
Note, 17 CORNELL L.Q. 158 (1931) ; Note, 33 B.U.L. REv. 90 (1953).
'Origin of this term is attributed to Gregory, Vicarious Responsibility and
Contributory Negligence, 41 YALE L.J. 831 (1932).
'Relationships in which the doctrine has been repudiated are: (1) driver-
passenger, Underwood v. Tremaine, 64 Wn. 2d 12, 390 P.2d 533 (1964); RESTATE-
MENT (SEcOND), TORTS § 490 (1965); (2) host-guest, Knight v. Borgan, 52 Wn. 2d
219, 324 P.2d 797 (1958); (3) husband-wife, Sherman v. Korff, 353 Mich. 387,
91 N.W.2d 485 (1958) ; RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 487 (1965) ; (4) parent-
child, Voien v. Cluff, 69 Wash. Dec. 2d 311, 418 P.2d 430 (1966); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND), TORTS § 488 (1965); (5) bailor-bailee, United States v. Washington,
351 F.2d 913 (9th Cir. 1965) ; RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 489 (1965).
See Friedenthal, Imputed Contributory Negligence: The Anomaly in California:
Hehicle Code Section. 17150, 17 STAN. L. REv. 55, 66 (1964).
See James, supra note 3.8 Poutre v. Sanders, 19 Wn. 2d 561, 143 P.2d 554 (1944). See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND), AGENCY § 219, comment a (1958).
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justify imputed contributory negligence, a doctrine which presupposes
that a master is innocent of any personal fault.9 Thus, unable to find
any rationale for imputation in the principal case, the court abandoned
the "both-ways" rule and permitted the master a cause of action
against the negligent third party's principal.
Commentators long have been critical of imputed contributory negli-
gence.' ° The principal case, however, rejected the rule only insofar as
it had been applied in automobile negligence cases. Such cases are
distinctive in that a master's property is subject to risks caused by
concurrent negligence of his servant and a third party. This feature
is necessary for a cause of action to accrue in a master which would
be subject to an imputed contributory negligence defense. Further-
more, automobile negligence cases are distinctive because the public
may be endangered by a master controlling his servant's driving.
Situations where exercise rather than non-exercise of a master's control
is against public policy are rare." Only in these situations, however,
does the right of control theory fail to justify imputation of contribu-
tory negligence.
In limiting its decision to automobile negligence cases, the court in
the principal case may have been motivated by a greater likelihood of
liability insurance coverage by the parties in such cases. If defendant
carries automobile liability insurance, depriving him of the defense of
imputed contributory negligence does not create the individual hard-
ships which otherwise might arise in the absence of insurance. Finan-
cial responsibility statutes and prudent business practice dictate liabil-
ity insurance coverage of automobile operation, so there is reasonable
assurance that abolition of imputed contributory negligence in this
situation would not cause an appreciable shift in financial burdens.
By abandoning imputation in automobile negligence cases, the court
12 HARPER & JAMES, op. cit. supra note 3, at § 23.6.
1 0 See, e.g., GREGORY, op. cit. supra note 3; 2 HARPER & JAMES, op. cit. upra note 3;
PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 3, at 501-02; James, Vipra note 3; Lessler, supra note 3,
at 175; Comment, 26 TENN. L. Rv. 531, 547 (1959).
Reasons advanced in opposition to the doctrine of imputed contributory negligence
are: (1) it does not distribute accident losses among those whose conduct causes
accidents; (2) it is not needed as an incentive to insure the careful selection and
control of employees-vicarious liability already supplies that incentive. James,
stepra.
"In most cases where an employer's exercise of control over his employee would
be against public policy, the agency relationship between them is that of employer-
independent contractor, rather than that of master-servant. Rejection of right of
control in the principal case does not change the relationship of the parties from
master-servant to that of employer-independent contractor, as the master is still
vicariously liable for his servant's torts. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), AGENCY § 2,
comment b (1958).
[ VOL. 42: 621
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evidenced a return to the fault standard of tort liability for negli-
gence. 12 Yet, in imposing sole liability for plaintiff-master's injury
upon the corporate employee (and vicariously upon the corporate
defendant), plaintiff's servant escaped liability even though contribu-
torily at fault. It is unlikely that a plaintiff-master will ever join his
servant as defendant in a negligence action against a third party, as a
servant usually has a "shallow pocket" and such joinder could be
inimical to the employer-employee relationship. To conform liability
with fault, a negligent third party should be allowed contribution 3
from plaintiff's servant as a concurrent tortfeasor, 14 either by implead-
ing the servant as a third party defendant in the original suit" or by
a separate action. If contribution is accomplished apportioning dam-
ages among concurrent tortfeasors on a pro-rata basis,' 6 liability would
not be aligned precisely with fault unless each tortfeasor's negligence
was equal. A few jurisdictions allow contribution among concurrent
tortfeasors according to comparative fault on a percentage basis.'
Such a method would align liability with fault-plaintiff's servant
would contribute in proportion to his responsibility for plaintiff's
damage, while defendant servant (and vicariously defendant master)
would contribute in proportion to his responsibility for the damage.
Had defendant master foreseen rejection of the "both-ways" rule
in the principal case, it might have counterclaimed for damage to its
vehicle caused by the negligence of plaintiff's servant. Indeed, a coun-
12 Regarding a fault standard, the court in the principal case simply may have
intended that no faultless party be barred from recovery by the imputed fault of
another. A more rigorous application of the fault standard would impose liability in
proportion to respective fault.
"Eight states have adopted the 1939 version of the UNIFORMi CoNTRuTIoN
AMONG TORT FEASORs Acr; eight states limit contribution by statute to joint
judgment defendants; six states have broad contribution statutes, leaving most ques-
tions to the courts; and six states recognize a common law right of contribution.
9 U.L.A. 120 (Supp. 1965). Washington does not generally recognize a right of
contribution between joint tortfeasors. City of Seattle v. Andrew Peterson & Co.,
99 Wash. 533, 170 Pac. 140 (1913).
" The apparent inconsistency between a master obtaining contribution directly
from another's servant, and the doctrine of vicarious liability, -where a master is
liable for the negligence of his own servant is discussed in the text accompanying
note 23 infra.
"See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a) ; WASH. R. PLEAD., PRAC., PROC. 14(a) (1960).
"See, e.g., White v. Johnson, 272 Minn. 363, 137 N.W.2d 674 (1965). This rule
is also advocated by the Commissioners of the UNIFORM CONTRMUTIONr AmONG TORT
FEAsons AcT (1955), 9 U.L.A. 123 (Supp. 1965).
'1 Little v. Miles, 213 Ark. 725, 212 S.W.2d 935 (1948) ; Mitchell v. Branch, 45
Hawaii 128, 363 P.2d 969 (1961) ; Bielsld v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 114 N.W.2d 105
(1962). Significantly, these three jurisdictions also have general comparative neg-
ligence statutes. Their courts would be better able to accommodate a comparative
fault contribution doctrine than jurisdictions where comparative negligence is not
recognized.
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terclaim may be necessary if defendant is to obtain recovery at all
under rules of procedure which make counterclaims compulsory when
arising out of the same transaction as the subject matter of plaintiff's
claim.' Two injured masters, each faultless, should be permitted to
sue each other's negligent servant. A similar result is reached in host-
guest cases where two negligent drivers, each accompanied by a guest,
are involved in a collision. 9 The drivers, though not liable to each
other because each may assert the defense of contributory negligence,
are nevertheless liable to each other's guest.20 Recovery by the two
faultless guests is analogous to recovery by two faultless masters.
Masters thus effectively become guests in their own vehicles, with the
important difference that they may sue their own servant-drivers for
indemnification,2' whereas guests may not sue their host-drivers with-
out proof of aggravated misconduct. 2
The doctrine of vicarious liability, however, demands that masters
sue each other for their respective injuries, rather than each other's
servant.23 Consequently, when each master pays the other's damages,
the one who has sustained the lesser injury will incur a loss to the
extent that the other's claim is larger, i.e., greater liability is imposed
upon the party sustaining the lesser harm. While this appears to
depart from fault as the standard of negligence liability, each master
is liable to the other solely because of vicarious liability; liability
is based upon fault-his servant's negligence-for which a master is
responsible. Furthermore, liability will be aligned with fault if contri-
bution is allowed, so that each servant pays in proportion to his
responsibility for his own master's damage. 4
"
8See, e.g., FED. R. Crv. P. 13(a); WASH. R. PLEAD., PRAc., PROC. 13(a) (1960).
"' See Friedenthal, supra note 6.
'See Rutherford v. Deur, 46 Wn. 2d 435, 282 P.2d 281 (1955) (in suit against
third party, driver's negligence not imputable to plaintiff guest).
' Cf. Marshall v. Chapman's Estate, 31 Wn. 2d 137, 195 P.2d 656 (1948) (master
liable for servant's negligence within general scope of employment can recover from
servant).
See, e.g., WAsH. REV. CODE § 46.08.080 (1961).
M Normally when a tort occurs as a result of concurrent fault, no party can recover
because of the contributory negligence defense. Abandonment of the "both-ways"
rule, however, makes this defense inapplicable between two faultless masters who
may sue each other for damages caused by their negligent servants.
I A hypothetical illustrates this point. A master, M, whose servant, Si, is 20% at
fault, suffers injury to the extent of $100. The other master, M, whose servant, S:!,
is 80% at fault, suffers injury to the extent of $50. Each master is held liable for the
other's damages. Case 1: If no contribution is allowed, Mi and M2 must pay each
other's damages (Mi pays M2 $50; M2 pays Mi $100) without regard to the relative
negligence of their servants. Case 2: If pro-rata contribution is allowed, M can
obtain Y/ of M,'s damage claim-$25--from S2, his concurrent tortfeasor. Similarly,
M2 can obtain Y2 of M1's damage claim-$50-from Si, his concurrent tortfeasor. 1i
[ VOL,. 42 : 621
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The suggestion that contribution from negligent servants is a desir-
able concomitant to repudiation of imputed contributory negligence is
consistent with a doctrine of vicarious liability. Vicarious liability
seeks to provide a master's deep pocket as a reliable source of compen-
sation for an innocent third party injured by a negligent servant.
When a vicariously liable master seeks contribution from plaintiff's
servant, however, his purpose is not to obtain compensation for his
own harm, but rather to distribute liability among concurrent tort-
feasors. A servant's personal responsibility in this regard does not
jeopardize recovery by an injured party. It permits repudiation of an
unjustifiable doctrine of imputed contributory negligence while return-
ing negligence liability to the fault standard.
One final problem may be created by this unique situation. When
two masters sue each other to recover for their respective damages,
there is little doubt that, as between them, set-offs are proper. But if
each carries liability insurance, should the insurers likewise be entitled
to those set-offs? As a general proposition, an insurer would not have
a right to set-off a claim which its insured had against the injured
plaintiff."' Where, as in the principal case, however, the claims arise
out of the same accident, such set-off might be allowed an insurer to
balance the increased likelihood of liability resulting from repudiation
of the defense of imputed contributory negligence.2 6
therefore pays a net of $25 ($50 less $25 contribution) to M2 ; M2 pays a net of $50 toAll ($100 less $50 contribution). Case 3: If comparative contribution is allowed, M1
can obtain 80% of Mi's damage claim-$40-from S:. Similarly, M2 can obtain 20%
of MI's damage claim-$20--from S.. M% therefore pays a net of $10 ($50 less $40 con-
tribution) to M2; M2 pays a net of $80 to M, ($100 less $20 contribution). M1i is com-pen-ated for 80% of his harm, and M2 for 20% of his, thus aligning fault with liability.
" Set-off is a judicial remedy to settle opposing affirmative demands between
parties in a single action. See Harrison v. Adams, 20 Cal. 2d 646, 128 P.2d 9 (1942).
A liability insurer may not be joined as a third party defendant in tort cases unless
it is directly liable to plaintiff by statute or contract. WAsH. R. PLE-AD., PP~c.,
PRoc. 14(c).3See Farmers Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Milwaukee Auto. Ins. Co., 8 Wis. 2d 512,
99 N.W. 2d 746 (1959) (dictum). For a discussion of this problem under a com-
parative negligence statute, see Leflar and Wolfe, Arust the Insurer Reimburse the
Insured for His Personal Loss Credited against the Judgment?, 11 ARK. L. Rsv. 71(1956). This set-off problem was later eliminated in Arkansas by enactment of a
comparative negligence statute limiting recovery in an action to one party. Note,
11 ARK. L. REv. 391, 392 (1957).
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